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WALKING OUT ON STUDENT SPEECH:
THE EROSION OF TINKER AND HOW PICKERING
PROMISES TO RESTORE IT
Emily Brown*
ABSTRACT
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District has
been the law for fifty years, but it has failed to adequately protect
student speech. Courts don’t know how to apply it correctly,
schools don’t know how to implement it constitutionally, and
students are left unable to contribute their views to the free
marketplace of ideas. Nowhere were Tinker’s shortcomings more
apparent than in the aftermath of the student walkouts in
response to the February 14, 2018, shooting in Parkland, Florida.
Schools scrambled to respond in a way that would protect their
students and, in the process, ended up engaging in
unconstitutional content and viewpoint discrimination.
Meanwhile, courts have allowed censorship of students by
gradually removing Tinker’s protective teeth, finding speech
capable of causing the meagerest “disruption.” A revised legal
standard is in order so that student speech on important, schoolrelated issues, like gun violence in schools, can be heard. This
note proposes that student speech doctrine borrow from Pickering
v. Board of Education and the public employee speech doctrine and
find passive student protest on school-related matters of public
concern per se not substantially disruptive under Tinker.

* Emily Brown is a legal fellow at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
and a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and Haverford College.
She would like to thank her parents, Ann Wolski, and Emily Dixon for listening to
her talk about nothing but this article and understanding when she couldn’t talk at all
because she was working on this article. She would also like to thank Lily and Greg
Stanton Marra for the desk space and the sandwiches.

2

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

Table of Contents
A. Schools’ Response to the Walkouts ............................. 7
B. The Trouble with Tinker ....................................... 11
I. STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE: TINKER AND ITS CARVEOUTS .................................................................................... 14
A. Tinker’s Weakening ............................................. 15
B. Vanishing the Language in Tinker............................. 19
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS..................................... 20
A. Traces of the Pickering Framework in School Settings ...... 22
B. Public Concern in School-Related Speech ...................... 23
III. PROPOSED REVISION TO THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD26
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 30

“Chants of ‘Grades up! Guns down! as hundreds of Baltimore students
protest gun violence during a school walkout. One girl just turned
around, looked at the massive line of students and said to her friend:
‘Wow, that’s all us.’”1
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District2
was decided fifty years ago. And yet, public school officials still
are unsure of the extent to which they can punish students for
speaking.3 Their uncertainty was brought to the fore by the mass
student walkouts that followed the February 14, 2018, shooting
at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida.4 Seventeen people died during the Parkland shooting,
1

Baltimore Students March on City Hall to Protest Gun Violence, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar.
6, 2018, 5:59 P.M.), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/baltimore-studentsmarch-on-city-hall-to-protest-gun-violence [hereinafter Baltimore Students].
2
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3
See Denise Lavoie, Schools Brace for Massive Student Walkouts over Gun Violence, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 11, 2018, 1:54 P.M.),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/schools-brace-for-massive-studentwalkouts-over-gun-violence.
4
Walkouts happened “sometimes in defiance of school authorities, who seemed
divided and even flummoxed about how to handle their emptying classrooms.” Alan
Blinder & Vivian Yee, Thousands Walk Out of Class, Urging Action on Gun Control, N.Y.
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and a month later nearly 1.6 million walked out of their
respective schools in response.5 Over 2,500 schools registered
with Youth Empower, the subproject of the Women’s March
that organized the walkout.6 But the scope of participation varied
greatly by school. At Myers Park High School in Charlotte,
North Carolina, the walkout had “hundreds” of participating
students.7 At Wilson Preparatory Academy two hundred miles
east in Wilson, North Carolina, there was only one.8
The months following the Parkland shooting saw a series
of walkouts. Although the March 14 walkout was the most
widely publicized and participated in, there were other walkouts,
including on February 27,9 March 6,10 and April 20.11 Some were
led primarily by the students,12 while others were planned by
parents13 or in coordination school administrators.14 Some took

TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/us/schoolwalkout.html.
5
Press Release, Women’s March Youth Empower, Women’s March Youth
Empower Announces Enough! Youth Week of Action, WOMEN’S MARCH (Feb. 21,
2019), https://womensmarch.com/press-releases/march-11-15-womens-marchyouth-empower-announces-enough-youth-week-of-action
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200211033744/https://womensmarch.com/pressreleases/march-11-15-womens-march-youth-empower-announces-enough-youthweek-of-action].
6
Scott Berson, Is Walking Out of School Protected by the First Amendment?, MIAMI
HERALD (Mar. 12, 2018, 2:55 P.M.),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article204724929.html.
7
Hank Lee, ‘Enough is Enough’: Local Students Stage Walkout to Protest Gun Violence,
WCNC (Mar. 14, 2018, 11:08 A.M.),
https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/politics/enough-is-enough-local-studentsstage-walkouts-to-protest-gun-violence/275-528484704.
8
Gianluca Mezzofiore & Paul P. Murphy, At a School in North Carolina, He Was the
Only One of 700 Students Who Walked Out, CNN (Mar. 15, 2018, 2:55 A.M.),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/14/us/student-walks-out-alone-trnd/index.html.
9
Lavoie, supra note 3.
10
Baltimore Students, supra note 1.
11
Bruce Henderson, Myers Park High Students Say They Were Suspended for Walkout
Over Gun Violence, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:00 A.M.),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article209440224.html.
12
Baltimore Students, supra note 1.
13
See Tom Dart, Walkout Wednesday: Students Risk Punishment for Joining Gun Control
Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2018, 1:00 P.M.),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/13/walkout-wednesdaystudents-gun-control-protest.
14
Tim Moran, Walkout at Bloom A Student Idea Embraced by Administration,
PATCH.COM (Mar. 14, 2018, 12:50 P.M.),
https://patch.com/illinois/chicagoheights/walkout-bloom-student-idea-embracedadministration.
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the form of vigils while others became public forums15 or even
miles-long marches.16 But all of them encompassed a political
message: that in light of the frequency of school shootings, gun
control laws need to be more stringent.17
Lawmakers took notice of the widespread public support
these students garnered and passed gun control legislation in
twenty-six states.18 Federal,19 state,20 and local21 elected officials
participated in walkouts across the country. And the Parkland
survivors soon became nationally recognized activists.22
The Parkland walkouts were not the first time that student
speech tipped the scales toward reform on an important schoolrelated political issue.23 Historically, student activism on schoolrelated issues has been especially potent.24 Some chalk this up to
students’ age,25 but common sense tells us that when an issue
15

Mark Price, SC School Backtracks: Students Can Debate Gun Control, but Can’t Join
National Walkout, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 7, 2018, 2:39 P.M.),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article203942129.html.
16
Baltimore Students, supra note 1.
17
Id.
18
Dakin Andone, Parkland Survivors Turned into Activists and Inspired a Wave of New
Gun Safety Laws, CNN (Feb. 11, 2019, 4:08 A.M.),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/11/us/parkland-change-gun-controllegislation/index.html.
19
Hawai’i Governor, US Senator Join Student-Led Walkout, MAUINOW.COM (Mar. 14,
2018 12:27 P.M.), https://mauinow.com/2018/03/14/governor-ige-joins-studentled-walkout/.
20
Id.; Tim Willert, Students walk out of class to protest gun violence, THE OKLAHOMAN
(Mar. 14, 2018, 1:39 P.M.), https://oklahoman.com/article/5587044/studentswalk-out-of-class-to-protest-gun-violence.
21
Willert, supra note 20; Baltimore Students, supra note 1.
22
Charlotte Alter, The School Shooting Generation Has Had Enough, TIME (Mar. 22,
2018, 7:00 A.M.), https://time.com/longform/never-again-movement/.
23
Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critic in Public Schools,
62 AM. U.L. REV. 253, 256 (2012) (“[C]hildren have been agents of transformative
American legal reforms that began in public schools but later reshaped the wider
constitutional consciousness.”). In 1951, Barbara Johns and her fellow students
walked out of R.R. Moton High School in Prince Edward County, Virginia in
protest of the unequal conditions in black and white schools, initiating a series of
events that led to the historic ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Id. at 285. Over 10,000 students in Los Angeles public schools walked out in
1968 in protest of school policies discriminating against Mexican American students.
Kathryn Schumaker, Why the Parkland, Fla., High School Students Make Such Powerful
Activists, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/02/21/whythe-parkland-students-make-such-powerful-activists/.
24
Brown, supra note 23; Schumaker, supra note 23.
25
See Schumaker, supra note 23 (arguing that students are particularly effective
advocates because “[y]oung people often have a greater sense of the possibilities for
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concerns schools, students are the ones with the most at stake.
As one parent of a student who walked out commented, “[t]hese
kids are the ones in school having to deal with this issue, not us,
. . . and I feel that they have every right to make their opinions
known . . . .”26
Many colleges and universities demonstrated their
recognition of the importance of allowing students to speak on
gun violence in schools by publicly announcing that they would
not hold punishments for participating in the walkouts against
applicants.27 Richard H. Shaw, dean of undergraduate admission
and financial aid at Stanford University, said, “[g]iven the nature
of this national tragedy and the true and heartfelt response of
students in expressing their perspectives and expectations, the
University will not consider the choice of students to participate
in protests as a factor in the review of present or future
candidates.”28 But while colleges and universities had no qualms
about supporting students’ choice to walk out, elementary,
middle, and high schools’ responses showed misgivings.
According to Women’s March Youth Empower, the March
14 walkout “was the largest distributed single-day protest in
history.”29 With such high levels of participation, the walkout
was bound to provoke enforcement actions from school officials.
And it did.30 The responses to the walkouts from principals,
superintendents, and teachers were marked by confusion.31

change than their elders do and less concern about the short-term consequences of
seeking long-term reforms”).
26
Price, supra note 15 (quoting interview with parent Jo Stephens).
27
Clay Calvert, What the National School Walkout Says about Schools and Free Speech,
THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:48 A.M.),
https://theconversation.com/what-the-national-school-walkout-says-about-schoolsand-free-speech-93327.
28
Id.
29
Women’s March Youth Empower, supra note 5.
30
See, e.g., Lavoie, supra note 3; Samie Gebers, 40 Scottsdale Middle-school Students
Suspended After Walkout, AZ CENTRAL (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:59 P.M.),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/scottsdaleeducation/2018/02/28/40-scottsdale-middle-school-students-suspended-afterwalkout/381459002/.
31
Blinder & Yee, supra note 4.
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Suspending students for missing class is not necessarily
an unconstitutional action.32 But some school officials reacted in
ways that demonstrated a disregard for the First Amendment
rights of their students.33
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,34 the Supreme Court held that although public school
students do enjoy First Amendment protection while at school,
the school may discipline students for engaging in speech that
“substantially interfere[s] with the work of the school or
impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.”35
Schools need to be able to respond to situations on a caseby-case basis. Still, school principals are on the frontline of
preserving students’ First Amendment rights. There is a risk that
administrators may attribute the aggregate disturbance a walkout
causes to each individual participant.36 For a school
administrator, a disruption may seem more substantial, and
therefore punishable, when two hundred students leave class
than when one does, or when students walk out multiple times.
But, in application, this kind of response can afford students at
schools with less activism more of a right to speak than students
at schools where the activism is stronger. This kind of disparate
treatment shows that a more coherent rule is needed to protect
student speech when they are engaging in political activism, that
is, when it matters most.

32

See Students’ Rights: Speech, Walkouts, and Other Protests, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/student-speech-and-privacy/studentsrights-speech-walkouts-and-other-protests (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
33
See infra, Section A.
34
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
35
Tinker , 393 U.S. at 509.
36
During the Parkland walkouts, students at schools where activism was less
widespread were sometimes punished less than their peers who participated in largescale walkouts. See, e.g., Alex Lasker, Students punished for school walkout serve detention
while holding signs featuring Parkland victims’ names, AOL.COM (Mar. 19, 2018, 12:55
P.M.), https://www.aol.com/article/news/2018/03/19/students-punished-forschool-walkout-serve-detention-while-holding-signs-featuring-parkland-victimsnames/23389690/ (over 200 students walked out, and were given detention);
Mezzofiore & Murphy, supra note 8 (one student walked out, and was not punished).
Tellingly, in explaining why he did not discipline his students for walking out,
Superintendent Jeffrey Rutzky of West Orange, New Jersey rationalized, “[i]t was a
small group of students.” Eric Kiefer, West Orange Students Hold School Walkout For
Parkland Victims, PATCH.COM (Feb. 22, 2018, 2:11 P.M.), https://patch.com/newjersey/westorange/west-orange-students-hold-school-walkout-parkland-victims.
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Part I of this article addresses student speech
jurisprudence and the erosion of Tinker’s First Amendment
protections. Part II assesses the public employee speech
framework’s application to students. Part III explains how these
two areas of the law can be fused to form a more coherent, more
appropriately protective, and more constitutionally sound
standard to apply to student speech.

A. Schools’ Response to the Walkouts
In responding to the Parkland walkouts, schools seemed
worryingly unaware of how to handle the potential disturbance
to class without infringing on the speech rights of their students.
For example, an online post by the Association of Wisconsin
School Administrators (AWSA) attempted to provide guidance
for principals planning response strategies to the walkouts.37 The
guidelines suggested that principals tell their communities that
they want protests to be “peaceful and positive.”38 “Peaceful,” to
an extent, is a reasonable time, place, and manner requirement
for a protest,39 but “positive,” insofar as it requires a certain tone
or messaging, is a content-based distinction.40 Here, the AWSA
treated them as almost synonymous.41
The post shows great concern for non-protesting students,
imploring principals to make sure they would not feel coerced
into walking out, would not be harassed, would still get taught,
and would be allowed to express a contrary viewpoint to those
of the protesters.42 But no recommendations were given as to
whether to punish student protesters or how to do so without
violating their rights.43 The post also showed a worrying lack of
knowledge about the historical significance of student speech:
37

Malina Piontek, Student Walk Outs and Protests: Tips for Principals, ASS’N OF WIS.
SCH. ADM’RS https://awsa.memberclicks.net/update-article--student-walk-outs-andprotests--tips-for-principals (last visited Jul. 3, 2019).
38
Id.
39
Cf. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (explaining that the First Amendment
extends to peaceful actions of protest).
40
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Government regulation of
speech” is content-based, if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed”).
41
See Piontek, supra note 37.
42
Id.
43
See id.
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“Student protest is a relatively new issue for school leaders, but
one that will likely to [sic] continue to impact schools, students,
staff members and families in the months and years to come.”44
Again, Tinker was decided fifty years ago. Student activism is not
a new issue, and yet the educators here were neither prepared to
work around it nor aware of why it is important to do so.
Some schools reacted negatively to the political nature of
the walkouts. Needville Independent School District
Superintendent Curtis Rhodes, of Needville, Texas, said that the
school would discipline a walkout specifically for being political
speech.45 In Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, the school board
decided that students would not be punished for participating
because the board understood it to be an act of memorial for the
victims of the Parkland shooting.46 When it became clear that the
walkouts were also a political protest of the effects of gun policy
on schools, the school board changed its position.47 These
policies of restricting political speech for being political are “a
quintessential First Amendment violation.”48
Prior to the walkout at Powdersville High School in
Greenville, South Carolina, the school posted on its Facebook
page that “[a]ny students involved in the event have been asked
to focus on school safety, including increased mental health
counselors and increased funding and training for SRO officers,
not gun control.”49 When asked, the school explained that it was
against the walkout because school officials believed students
were “being told by outside groups what [they] should do and
how [they] should react.”50 Here, Greenville school officials were
threatening not mere content-based discrimination, but
viewpoint-based discrimination.51
44

Id.
Karma Allen, Texas Superintendent Vows to Suspend Students Who Walk Out to Protest
Guns, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018, 6:32 A.M.), https://abcnews.go.com/US/texassuperintendent-vows-suspend-students-walkout-protest-guns/story?id=53268955.
46
Blinder & Yee, supra note 4.
47
Id.
48
Sarah Gray, Texas School Threatens to Suspend Any Students Who Leave Class to Protest,
TIME (Feb. 22, 2018, 5:18 P.M.), https://time.com/5171089/texas-school-threatenssuspend-students-protest/ (quoting Georgetown law professor Heidi Li Feldman).
49
Price, supra note 15.
50
Id.
51
“Government discrimination among viewpoints—or the regulation of speech
based on ‘the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
45
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Unconstitutional treatment by schools even spawned
litigation in at least two courts. In M.C. ex rel. Chudley v. Shawnee
Mission Unified School District No. 512,52 students planned to
participate in the April 20 walkout by assembling outside and
giving speeches.53 The school district said that it would not
punish students for participating, but it did not endorse the
event.54 Like in Powdersville, the district notified students that
during the walkout, they could only discuss school safety and
would not be permitted to discuss gun control or school
shootings.55 School officials enforced this policy by ordering
students off of the microphone when they mentioned shooting or
gun violence, punishing students who stayed outside beyond the
first seventeen minutes, and prohibiting student journalists from
documenting the event.56 The court found the plaintiffs’ claim
that the schools’ actions were unconstitutional survived a motion
to dismiss.57
In M.O. v. Hononegah Community High School District
#207,58 students alerted school officials that they planned to
participate in the March 14 walkout. The school agreed to not
punish students for participating and allowed them to assemble
on the football field.59 During the actual walkout, however, the
plaintiff and a small group of other students seeking to express
pro-gun views were directed to a section of the parking lot out of
view and earshot of the group on the football field.60 When the
plaintiff asked why she was not allowed to join the large group,
staff replied that no one else agreed with their views and that they
speaker’—is a ‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content discrimination.’” Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 168 (2015) (citation omitted).
52
363 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (D. Kan. 2019).
53
Id. at 1191.
54
Id. at 1191–92 (stating that “[a]s a public institution, [the district] cannot take a
stand one way or the other on Second Amendment rights”).
55
Id. at 1191.
56
Id. at 1192–93.
57
Id. at 1202 (“Because the only justification for the speech restrictions alleged in the
Complaint is the need to avoid association with a controversial topic, the Court
cannot find at this stage of the litigation that SMSD reasonably forecast that the
students’ speech during the walkout would cause substantial disruption with
discipline or student safety. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a
plausible claim that their First Amendment rights were violated by the District’s
speech restrictions during the walkout.”).
58
No. 18 C 50260, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81773 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2019).
59
Id. at *5.
60
Id. at *5–6.
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would cause trouble.61 The court said that, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, her First
Amendment rights had been violated because the school
discriminated against her viewpoint.62
Student protests happen over other school-related
national issues besides gun control. For example, hundreds of
students at Bartlesville High School in Bartlesville, Oklahoma
walked out in February of 2018 to protest cuts in state education
funding.63 In other cases, students have been threatened with
disciplinary action for kneeling during the national anthem at
school sporting events in protest of police violence against
communities of color.64 Students have also been punished for
their participation in the National Day of Silence, on which
students take a vow to remain silent during the school day to
draw attention to the plight of bullied LGBTQ students.65
But the walkouts in response to the Parkland shooting in
particular are a powerful example of how students can engage in
large scale speech that is both school-related and political.66
Students’ speech on this issue exemplifies why speech is
protected in the first place. It was important to shaping the
national debate, it was important to students’ expressing grief,
frustration, and apprehension, and it was important to their
engagement as active citizens. And yet, many students were
unsure of their right to speak out on this issue. Meanwhile,
school officials themselves were unsure of how to treat student
protesters, or outright refused to protect their students’ rights.
These are the exact kind of conditions in which speech can be
chilled.

61

Id.
Id. at *22.
63
Yee & Blinder, supra note 4.
64
Evie Blad, Can Schools Punish Students for Protesting the National Anthem?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 7, 2016, 2:03 P.M.),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/schools-students-protesting-nationalanthem.
65
See Hatcher v. Fusco, 570 F. App’x. 874, 876 (11th Cir. 2014).
66
See Baltimore Students, supra note 1; Brian Dickerson, Opinion, Teachers and
Students, Unhappy and Fired-Up, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 22, 2018, 6:00 A.M.),
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/briandickerson/2018/04/22/student-gun-control-protests/536652002/.
62
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B. The Trouble with Tinker
It is well-established that public school students enjoy
some amount of First Amendment protections, especially when
engaging in political speech. Tinker, the case that articulated the
standard against which these protections are measured, was
about students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War.67 A fundamental principle of First Amendment
jurisprudence is that protections are most important when they
are about political speech.68 This principle is no less applicable
when the speaker is a student.69
Even so, student speech has been treated unfavorably by
courts over the past five decades as several categorical exceptions
to the Tinker rule have been added, and even the Tinker rule itself
has been applied less and less stringently.70 Although courts
never admit to it, it seems like a large part of the reason for this
decline in protection is that the student speech evaluated by
courts is often crude in tone.71 Courts compare students calling
67

Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“We should be ever mindful of the wise counsel of Chief Justice
Hughes: ‘Imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.’”)
(quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)); See Cohen v. California,
401 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free expression . . . is designed
and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of
us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry.”).
69
See Tinker, 393 U.S at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”).
70
See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second
Circuit expressed confusion and frustration with the application of Tinker’s scope as
“[i]t is not entirely clear whether Tinker’s rule applies to all student speech that is not
sponsored by schools . . . or whether it applies only to political speech or to political
viewpoint-based discrimination.” Id.; see also Geoffrey A. Starks, Tinker’s Tenure in
the School Setting: The Case for Applying O’Brien to Content-Neutral Regulations, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 65 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/tinkers-tenure-in-theschool-setting-the-case-for-applying-obrien-to-content-neutral-regulations (noting that
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) is favored by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits over a Tinker analysis).
71
Brown, supra note 23, at 328 (stating that there is a “mounting number of incidents
involving extreme, vulgar, and intemperate on-line student speech about school
personnel.”).
68
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principals “douchebags”72 and the like to the silently dignified
act of wearing a black armband, and find the former disruptive
and, therefore, unprotected.73 The actual difference between
these situations is likely the courts’ perceived importance of the
speech at issue, not how disruptive it is. Couching this distinction
in terms of the reasonable likelihood of a substantial disruption
does not disguise the fact that courts are disfavoring speech based
on content.
This is not a faithful interpretation of the standard set
down in Tinker. Aside from general jurisprudential coherency
concerns, this interpretation is problematic because it allows
content discrimination without subjecting it to strict scrutiny.74
Content discrimination is held to the strictest scrutiny because it
can easily be a cover for viewpoint discrimination.75 This is
especially troubling in the school environment, where students
are under the power and control of the school. Students who
complain about teachers or school officials may do so simply
because they were disciplined and are unhappy about it. But their
unhappiness might also stem from being disciplined under
arbitrary or unjust school policies.76 School officials cannot be
allowed to discriminate against student viewpoints, and courts
cannot permit them to do so based on content.

72

See, e.g., Doninger v. Niefhoff, 642 F.3d 334, 340 (2d Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir. 2015) (Costa,
J., concurring) (implying that the whistleblowing aspect of plaintiff’s rap was
outweighed by the violence of his lyrics). See also J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., No.
3:07cv585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (“The type of
speech involved in Tinker is political speech. In the instant case, the speech is not
political; rather it [sic] was vulgar and offensive statement . . .”).
74
“[T]he First Amendment . . . does not countenance governmental control over the
content of messages expressed by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content. . . . In contrast, regulations
that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641–42 (1994) (citations omitted).
75
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (standing for the idea that
First Amendment doctrine may be most coherently understood as “tools to flush out
illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them”).
76
This form of student dissent is especially vulnerable to covert viewpoint
discrimination. See Brown, supra note 23, at 255.
73
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On the other hand, allowing some speech can be
detrimental for schools. School officials have legitimate concerns
about maintaining authority and a mutually respectful
environment for students and teachers.77 The inexactness of the
current standard does not adequately protect those concerns and,
as a result, is being misapplied in such a way as to allow schools
to overly protect them.
I propose a revision to address this flaw in the application
of the Tinker standard. To make sure that student speech is
protected where and when it matters most, courts should
incorporate a version of the Pickering78 rule into their student
speech analysis. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court held that public employees enjoy First Amendment
protections when their free speech interest in commenting on
matters of public concern is not outweighed by the government’s
interest in restricting such speech as an employer.79
The key element of this rule is that Pickering offers
protection to public employees when they speak on matters of
public concern.80 The Supreme Court held that this protection
applies because public employees have expertise in matters of
public concern, making their speech about those areas especially
valuable.81 By nature of their position as students, when students
speak on school-related issues, they have a similar level of
expertise. Protecting student speech any time a student speaks on
a school-related issue, however, would be overly broad and lead
to schools not being able to control their students appropriately.
That is why I propose that the standard apply only to speech that
is about issues that are both school-related and of public concern.

77

Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
79
Id. at 573.
80
Id. at 568.
81
Id. at 571–72.
78
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I. STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE:
TINKER AND ITS CARVE-OUTS
Student speech jurisprudence is notoriously convoluted.82
Since Tinker was decided fifty years ago, the Supreme Court has
established three carve-outs in Fraser,83 Hazelwood,84 and Morse.85
If student speech is lewd or obscene,86 school-sponsored,87 or
promotes illegal drug use,88 it is unprotected by the First
Amendment. Fraser’s holding is parallel to First Amendment law
outside the school setting, which also does not protect obscene
speech.89 Hazelwood and Morse represent modifications based on
the special characteristics of the school setting.90 And yet, the
Court was not united in making those decisions,91 nor have lower
courts found this framework simple to apply.92
82

See Doninger v. Niefhoff, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The law governing
restrictions on student speech can be difficult and confusing, even for lawyers, law
professors, and judges.”); Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule
Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 690 (2010) (“A
somewhat incoherent collection of cases governs student speech.”).
83
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
84
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
85
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
86
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
87
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
88
Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.
89
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957).
90
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (finding that the rights of students “must be ‘applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Morse, 551 U.S. at 406
(“[T]he “nature of [students’ First Amendment] rights is what is appropriate for
children in school.”) (citation omitted).
91
Justice Thomas lamented the Court’s failure to clearly articulate when Tinker
applies: “I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to
speak in schools except when they do not.” Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
92
Courts have used a mix-and-match approach to student speech cases. See, e.g.,
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that “hate” is akin to
obscene speech in discussing applicability of Fraser to student speech); Wildman ex rel
Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying
both Tinker and Fraser to student speech that used the word “bullshit”); Doninger v.
Niefhoff, 642 F.3d 334, 354 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is not entirely clear whether Tinker’s
rule (as opposed to other potential standards) applies to all student speech not falling
within the holdings of Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse.”); Brown, supra note 23, at 331
(“Lower courts’ vigilance in protecting the participatory dimensions of citizenship at
school has been inconsistent, a deficiency likely traceable to changing cues from the
Supreme Court’s student speech cases.”); Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing
Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 657 (2011) (describing how courts have overly restricted
student speech that expresses a “genuine opinion” that is hostile about school officials
based on a “blended rationale” drawing on Tinker and Fraser).
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In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that student speech
that reasonably threatens to materially and “substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights
of other students” may be censored.93 This requires a showing
that the censorship was “necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.”94 Most
circuits have interpreted this to mean that if a substantial
disruption is reasonably foreseeable, school officials may punish
the speaker.95 To constitutionally censor student speech, a school
“must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.”96
A. Tinker’s Weakening
Because of the subjectiveness of the substantial disruption
rule, courts have ruled differently on almost identical fact
patterns.97As a result, Tinker’s effectiveness in defending student
free speech has decreased over time. Despite its holding that the
Tinkers’ protest was protected, and its iconic declaration that
neither “students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”98
courts mostly cite Tinker for the principle that students have

93

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 511.
95
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015); S.J.W. ex rel
Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012); Kowalski
v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).
96
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
97
See, e.g., West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000)
(ban on wearing confederate flags upheld); Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp. 2d 814,
826–27 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (ban on wearing confederate flags found
unconstitutional); see also Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Ind. Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d
668 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding a student’s claim that the school could not prevent him
from wearing a shirt with an anti-gay message in counter-protest of the Day of
Silence likely to succeed); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding no constitutional violation when a student was suspended for
wearing a shirt with an anti-gay message in counter-protest of the Day of Silence).
98
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
94
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limited rights in schools.99 The movement toward limiting student
speech has been led by the Supreme Court in finding three broad
carve-outs.100 But the application of Tinker itself in lower courts
has resulted in weak protections for students.
In Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J,101 high school
basketball players circulated a petition calling for their coach’s
resignation.102 The players then refused to play at the next game
and were dismissed from the team.103 The Ninth Circuit declined
to determine whether the players’ boycott of the game was
expressive conduct, concluding that even if it was expressive
conduct, the boycott caused a substantial disruption because the
game had to be played with replacement players.104 This was a
flawed ruling because the cancellation of a high school basketball
game does not interfere with the education of other students or
endanger the operation of the school as a whole. It does not
necessarily even endanger the operation of the basketball
program.
In Doninger v. Niehoff,105 student Avery Doninger was
Junior Class Secretary and organizer of a school-wide musical
competition called Jamfest.106 The event had to be rescheduled
because the staff member who ran the lights and sound for the
auditorium was unavailable on the planned day.107 Interpreting
the rescheduling of the event as a de facto cancellation, Avery
spoke out in response in several ways, first by emailing a group

99

See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3rd Cir. 2011) (citing
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 332, 348 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Tinker itself provides substantial grounds for the school officials here to have
concluded [they] had legitimate justification under the law for [punishing student
speech].”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d
584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting));
Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 177 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Tinker,
393 U.S. at 507).
100
Forster, supra note 82, at 690 (“Although Tinker’s holding reads like a general rule,
the Court has not treated it as such, and indeed has retreated from the holding in
later student speech cases, generally upholding schools’ power to regulate student
speech.”).
101
467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006).
102
Id. at 760–61.
103
Id. at 762.
104
Id. at 769–70.
105
642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
106
Id. at 339.
107
Id.
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of parents, students, and others encouraging their intervention,108
then by posting on a personal blog informing her classmates
about the situation.109 School administrators received calls and
emails about the perceived cancellation of the event.110 Some
students gathered outside the principal’s office with the intent to
stage a sit-in, but dispersed as soon as Avery asked them to.111
The blog post came to the attention of the administration and
Avery was prohibited from running for Senior Class Secretary.112
At the assembly during which candidates for student council
made campaign speeches, students wore shirts saying “Team
Avery,” “Support LSM Freedom of Speech” and “RIP
Democracy” in protest of the administration’s preventing
Avery’s candidacy.113
The Second Circuit held that substantial disruption was
foreseeable because it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech
contained in Avery’s blog post would reach campus.114 There has
been much discussion over whether speech taking place on or
off-campus should affect Tinker’s applicability.115 This article will
not comment on that debate, except to point out that in Doninger,
the Second Circuit did not just decide that Tinker applied because
it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach
campus, it also factored that finding into the substantial
disruption analysis.116 In other words, the Circuit held that it
being reasonably foreseeable that the post would reach campus
meant both that the substantial disruption standard was the
correct one to apply and that the post was in fact substantially
disruptive.117
In a discussion of whether there was a substantial
disruption in an earlier decision in the Doninger case, the Second
Circuit held that it was reasonably foreseeable that
“administrators and teachers would be further diverted from
108

Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 340–41.
110
Id. at 340–41.
111
Id. at 341.
112
Id. at 342.
113
Id. at 343.
114
Id. at 348.
115
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 n.8 (3d Cir.
2011); Waldman, supra note 92, at 654–56.
116
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348.
117
Id.
109
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their core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate
misguided anger or confusion over purported cancellation” of
the student event.118 In the subsequent opinion’s evaluation of
the reasonable foreseeability of substantial disruption, the Circuit
pointed to the phone calls and emails administrators received
about Jamfest, the fact that those administrators were taken
away from other duties to respond to those queries, students
being upset and gathering outside the principal’s office, and that
Avery and three other students were called out of class to the
principal’s office as evidence of substantial disruption.119
Administrators taking time to respond to community concern
about a school issue, multiple students being in the same place
in the school hallway and shortly dispersing, and four students
being temporarily removed from class, which presumably carried
on without them. This is a much lower standard than the one
contemplated in Tinker.120
Refocusing students from anger or confusion-inducing
stimuli is a routine part of classroom management.121 That one
of these stimuli could be sourced to student speech does not
mean that substantial disruption occurred. This principle should
apply to administrators as well. In Doninger, the Second Circuit
said administrators being forced to respond to calls and emails
from community members was a substantial disruption.122
Responding to calls and emails is a normal function of school
administrators. Even if the volume of calls and emails was
particularly high, it would not prevent teachers from teaching
and students from learning. To cause a substantial disruption,
118

Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d at 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
119
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349.
120
See Waldman, supra note 92, at 652 (“With regard to disruption . . . courts tend to
use this term loosely . . . sometimes implying that any ‘disrespectful’ or
‘insubordinate’ speech is inherently disruptive . . . . Although it may be true that such
speech typically causes some degree of disruption, it is important to keep in mind
Tinker’s focus on ‘substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
121
Robert J. Marzano & Jana S. Marzano, The Key to Classroom Management, 61
BUILDING CLASSROOM RELATIONSHIPS 6 (2003),
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educationalleadership/sept03/vol61/num01/The-Key-to-Classroom-Management.aspx
(“[S]eminal research points to the importance of establishing rules and procedures for
general classroom behavior, . . . transitions and interruptions, . . . and beginning and
ending the period of the day.”) (citations omitted).
122
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349.
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the call and email volume should have to be so high it actually
impedes the functioning of the school. Speech may impel
teachers and administrators to perform an essential part of their
jobs; it rarely would inhibit them from doing their jobs
altogether. The inclusion of the word “substantial” in Tinker
should be interpreted to mean an effect on the classroom beyond
the ordinary disruptions that occur in a roomful of teenagers.123
B. Vanishing the Language in Tinker
Another way in which courts have neutralized Tinker’s
protections is by reading “substantial” out of its holding. Many
courts complete the Tinker analysis by simply identifying
potential sources of any disruption, lending no words to whether
or not that disruption is substantial.124
The de facto elimination of “substantial” from the Tinker
holding does not just confuse lawyers and judges. There are realworld consequences for students and school officials. The
AWSA guidelines on handling student walkouts informed its
members: “[S]tudents have First Amendment rights, and school
officials may not censor student speech unless it becomes
disruptive to the educational process. Moreover, a school may
regulate speech when it can reasonably forecast that the speech
will cause a material disruption at school or interfere with the rights
of others.”125 At first glance, this looks like a simple misquote of
Tinker. But the misquote is not benign––it permits censorship for
mere disruption and regulation for mere interference.
The Sixth Circuit similarly read essential language out of
a Tinker holding in Lowery v. Euverard.126 In justifying the coach’s
dismissing the players before they presented their petition to
123

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 400 (5th Cir. 2015) (Jolly, J.,
concurring) (“When Tinker refers to a disruption, it is saying that student ideas may
be expressed on campus unless they are so controversial that the expression creates a
disruption.”).
124
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 945 (3d Cir.
2011) (Fisher, J., dissenting); Doninger, 642 F.3d at 50–52; Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch.
Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 767 n.17, 768 (9th Cir. 2006). One court referred to this type
of analysis as a “somewhat softened form” of Tinker. Schoenecker v. Koopman, 349
F. Supp. 3d 745, 752 (E.D. Wis. 2018).
125
Piontek, supra note 37 (emphasis added).
126
497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007).
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school administrators, the Sixth Circuit said “Tinker does not
require school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn
before closing the door. Nor does Tinker ‘require certainty that
disruption will occur.’”127 Absolute certainty is not required;
reasonable foreseeability is.128
Comparing laypeople’s understanding of a legal rule with
how courts understand it can be a helpful way of determining
whether it is being interpreted cogently. Attempting to explain
Tinker in advance of the Parkland walkouts, one journalist wrote:
Does a mass walkout qualify as a ‘substantial’
disruption in the school? That’s a call school
officials would have to make. But they would have
to show that the walkout made it impossible for
school staff to do their jobs or for teachers to
continue their lessons with those who stayed in
class.129
This is a much higher standard than has been applied by
courts. To bring the reality more in line with our purported law,
courts need a revised student speech framework.

II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS
Pickering did not set out standards for how to weigh the
interests between public employers and employees generally. But
it did set out that the petitioner’s interests outweighed the
school’s interests.130 The petitioner’s interests included the
general interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance,” and the contribution of their school-specific
expertise to that debate.131 Importantly, the Court pointed out
that teachers, as a class, are more likely to have expertise relevant
127

Id. at 591–92 (quoting Pinard, 467 F.3d at 767 n. 17).
See id.
129
Alexia Fernández Campbell, Students Have a Right to Protest Gun Violence, but They
Can’t Disrupt Class, VOX (Mar. 14, 2018, 8:55 A.M.),
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/13/17110210/national-school-walkout-free-speechguns.
130
Pickering v. Bd. Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (U.S. 1968).
131
Id. at 572–73.
128

2020]

WALKING OUT ON ST UDENT SPEECH

21

to how school funds are allocated than non-teachers.132 The
Court held that because their contributions to the free
marketplace of ideas on a school-related issue are especially
valuable, they must be especially protected.133
In Connick v. Myers,134 the Supreme Court held that
Pickering balancing may only be done when the employee’s
speech is on a matter of public concern.135 The Court explained
that speaking “as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest” was not protected.136 Following Connick, Pickering
would be applied with a two-step analysis. First, was the speech
about a matter of public concern?137 Second, did the government
employer’s interest outweigh the employee’s free speech
interest?138 In applying the first prong, the Court advised that
lower courts should examine “the content, form, and context of
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”139 More
specifically, matters of “political, social, or other concern to the
community,” but not matters “only of personal interest,” are of
public concern.140
Speech that is not about a matter of public concern
includes “‘bickering,’ ‘running disputes,’ or a personal
grievance.”141 In a school context, students’ opinion that a
particular teacher is bad at teaching would not be a matter of
public concern, but an opinion that there should be more
stringent qualifications for being a public school teacher would
be.142

132

Id. at 572.
Id. at 571–72.
134
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
135
Id. at 147.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 146–48.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 147–48.
140
Id. at 146–47.
141
Joan M. Eagle, First Amendment Protection for Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy:
Biting the Hand That Feeds You, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 259 (1984) (citation
omitted).
142
The Court refined the public employee speech framework one more time in
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 47 U.S. 410 (2006). In Garcetti the Court held that for Pickering to
apply, speech must be about a matter of public concern, and the speaker must be
speaking as a citizen rather than as an employee. Garcetti, 47 U.S. at 418.
133
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A. Traces of the Pickering Framework in School Settings
Several courts have grappled with the idea of “importing”
Pickering into Tinker.143 However, whenever considered, the
importation involves narrowing Tinker to apply only to matters
of public concern.144 This is a different modification to the
doctrine from the one proposed here. In Pinard, the district court
analogized the players’ situation to public employees and applied
Connick to find that the petition was unprotected because it was
about a private grievance with no “political dimension,” rather
than a matter of public concern.145 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that Connick was not applicable.146
In Lowery v. Euverard,147 high school football players
circulated a petition among the team that said “I hate Coach
Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him.”148 A few days
later, the coach learned about the petition and dismissed several
players from the team.149 The majority opinion hinged on the
different set of rights and institutional interests that come with
being a student athlete, as opposed to a student.150 The Sixth
Circuit clarified that “[t]his case [was] not primarily about [the]
Plaintiffs’ right to express their opinions, but rather their alleged
right to belong to the Jefferson County football team on their
own terms.”151 With this in mind, the majority analogized
student-athletes to public employees and applied a Pickering
balancing test that incorporated the Connick public concern
requirement.152
The District Court of Connecticut used public employee
case law on retaliation to evaluate whether the plaintiff had been

143

Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349–50 (2d Cir. 2011); Lowery v. Euverard,
497 F.3d 584, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2007).
144
See, e.g., Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 766 n.16 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“We did not, however, hold that Tinker protected only political speech or speech
that touches upon a matter of public concern.”).
145
Id. at 763.
146
Id. at 766, 771–72.
147
497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
148
Id. at 585.
149
Id. at 586.
150
Id. at 587.
151
Id. at 589.
152
Id. at 587–88, 596–99; see also id. at 601 (Gilman, J., concurring) (discussing the
application of Connick).
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subjected to viewpoint discrimination in Doninger.153 The Second
Circuit declined to adopt that line of reasoning,154 but did adopt
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Lowery, saying that students who
speak as students involved in extracurricular activities get
banned from those activities (instead of speaking as just students)
do not enjoy full protection under Tinker. 155 In other words, the
Second and Sixth Circuits found that students’ speech rights do
not fully extend to the extracurricular sphere.156 At the same
time, however, both courts grafted the limits of Tinker onto the
extracurricular context.157
B. Public Concern in School-Related Speech
Courts have generally shied away from applying Pickering
to student speech in a way that would require the student’s
speech be about a matter of public concern to be protected. But
students have made arguments claiming protection because they
spoke on matters of public concern, and courts have commented
on whether student speech touches on such matters.
In Morse, Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the
majority’s opinion expressly “on the understanding that . . . it
provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue . . . .”158 Justices Alito and Kennedy saw the need to protect
the ability of students to engage in discourse about matters of
public concern.159 Notably, the Third Circuit has interpreted this
limiting principle as controlling.160

153

Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Locurto v.
Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2006)), rev’d, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
154
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349–50.
155
Id. at 351 (“Here, however . . . it was objectively reasonable for school officials to
conclude that Doninger’s behavior was potentially disruptive of student government
functions . . . .”).
156
See id.; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 589.
157
See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 589.
158
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
159
Id.
160
See, e.g., B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 309–14 (3d
Cir. 2013) (discussing “linchpin concurrences”); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915, 927 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing the narrowness of the Morse holding
as stated by Justice Alito’s concurrence).
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As detailed above, in Pinard the Ninth Circuit declined to
apply Pickering to students.161 However, the Ninth Circuit was
mostly concerned that there was no precedent in which Pickering
was applied to students, and the Ninth Circuit in fact weighed in
on whether the students’ complaints about their basketball coach
constituted speech on a matter of public concern:
But even assuming Tinker were to include a public
concern requirement, the district court erred in
concluding that the plaintiffs’ speech was ‘merely
a private grievance.’ The plaintiffs’ criticisms of
Baughman were related to various issues of
‘concern to the community,’ including the
school’s performance of its duties to supervise its
teachers, monitor extracurricular activities and
provide a safe and appropriate learning
environment for its students. These are matters of
public concern.162
In Lowery, the Sixth Circuit applied Pickering because it
held that a student-athlete was analogous to a public
employee.163 It did not look at whether the team was speaking on
a matter of public concern,164 but it did imply that the importance
of the content of student speech could affect how the speech
would be treated.165
In Posthumus v. Board of Education,166 the court similarly
commented on the plaintiff’s speech against a teacher:
“Moreover, Posthumus’ speech did not concern a political issue
or a matter of public concern, as in Tinker, but instead was
directed at Posthumus’ private grievance regarding Vanderstelt’s
confiscation of Posthumus’ graham crackers.”167

161

Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765–66 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 767 n.18 (citation omitted).
163
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2007).
164
Id. at 598 n.5 (“Our holding in no way rests on a determination of
whether Plaintiffs’ speech touched on a matter of public or private concern.”).
165
Id. at 600 (“Nor was this a whistleblower situation, where players were disciplined
for reporting improprieties.”).
166
380 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Mich. 2005).
167
Id. at 902 (citation omitted).
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In Kyung Hye Yano v. City Colleges of Chicago,168 the district
court asserted that “[t]he functional compromise hashed out in
Connick/Pickering does not apply to student speech.”169 However,
it also found that “student speech in school that relates solely to
matters of private concern is subject to lower protections than
speech on matters of public concern . . . .”170
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,171 a student wrote
and recorded a rap song that alleged sexual misconduct on the
part of two school coaches.172 The rap included lyrics about the
student perpetrating violence against the coaches in retaliation
for their misconduct. 173 The student posted the rap on Facebook
and YouTube, expressed hope that the songs would be heard by
the administration and something would be done about the
coaches’ misconduct, and at trial testified that the rap “addressed
a matter of public concern.”174 The majority did not address this
argument beyond refuting Judge Dennis’s dissent, which argued
strongly for protection of the rap because it addressed a matter of
public concern.175
Judge Dennis wrote that the public concern test used in
Snyder v. Phelps176 of whether “the overall thrust and dominant
theme of [the song] spoke to broader public issues” was the
appropriate one, and that Bell’s rap satisfied the test.177 Judge
Dennis explained that, even when presented in unpalatable
forms, speech on matters of public concern needs protection:
“‘Freedom of speech’ is thus a hollow guarantee if it permits only
praise or state-sponsored propaganda. Freedom of speech exists
exactly to protect those who would criticize, passionately and
vociferously, the actions of persons in power.”178
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No. 08 CV 4492, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101121 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2013), aff’d on
other grounds by 651 F. App‘x. 543 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Id. at *23.
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Id. at 385, 387.
175
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In defining what qualifies as a matter of public concern,
Judge Dennis again cited Snyder, which provides that:
Speech deals with matters of public concern when
it can “be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,” or when it is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public.179
In Doninger’s discussion of whether Tinker applied, the
Second Circuit noted what it called “salient differences” between
Avery’s speech and the protest of the Tinker plaintiffs.180 This
passage was vague on what exactly it was that distinguished the
two cases, seeming to imply both the number of students
involved and the importance of the issue were factors.181 This
inexact analysis resulted, somehow, in a finding of qualified
immunity for the school officials: “In light of these significant
differences . . . an official in Defendants’ position who thought
that a less demanding standard of potential disruption might
apply could not be said to have an unreasonable understanding
of what the law requires.”182 It is true that a reasonable principal
might think that a student overreacting to the rescheduling of
Jamfest would be less constitutionally protected than a political
protest. But, under the current case law, that principal would
have been mistaken. If principals are allowed to make these sorts
of content-based distinctions, and courts are not going to correct
them, a new standard should be employed that reflects the actual
needs of schools.

III. PROPOSED REVISION TO THE
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
To review, the public employee speech framework
mandates that when a public employee is speaking as a citizen
(Garcetti) on a matter of public concern (Connick), the court
179

Id. at 406–07 (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453).
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 354 (2d Cir. 2011).
181
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182
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performs a Pickering- style balancing of interests.183 The factors of
a Pickering balance are not set in stone because the government
has different interests in different employment contexts, but
Pickering showed that courts should strongly protect free speech
rights and value the expertise public employees have on matters
of public concern pertaining to their position.184 The student
speech framework mandates that, unless the speech advocates
illegal drug use, is school-sponsored, or is lewd or obscene,
students retain full First Amendment rights when their speech
does not cause or cannot be reasonably foreseen to cause
substantial disruption or material interference with the rights of
others at school.185 That said, courts have broadly read
“substantial” and “material” out of this standard.186
I propose that courts recommit to Tinker by incorporating
a new bright-line rule about what qualifies as substantially
disruptive in conjunction with public employee-speech-style
limitations on the applicability of that rule. The new rule would
say that passive forms of protest are per se not substantially
disruptive, and the limiting factor would be whether the speech
pertains to a school-related matter of public concern. 187 Speech
about other matters would still be evaluated under Tinker.188
Protest is passive when it takes a form that does not
interfere with the routine conduct of others within the forum in
which it takes place. For example, the Supreme Court held that
civil rights protesters were protected when they engaged in a
silent sit-in in a segregated library because, in a library,
maintaining a “silent and reproachful presence” was an
“appropriate type[] of action.”189 The action was considered
appropriate because “no claim [could] be made that use of the
library by others was disturbed by the demonstration.”190 This
case was cited by the Tinker court in its discussion of non183
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disruptive, protected speech.191 Student walkouts are passive
because they do not necessarily disrupt the learning of students
who choose to remain in class. Other students may stay in class
and continue to be taught. Under the proposed standard, Courts
would look at the facts of the protest itself to determine whether
that protest is passive or substantially disruptive. This would
represent a departure from courts’ current application of Tinker,
in which tenuous connections are drawn between protest and
disruption and interference because of the hypothetical
undermining of authority officials might have reasonably
foreseen. Passive protests would be protected under Tinker as per
se not substantially disruptive.
A protest being protected because it is passive is a
reasonable interpretation of the Tinker rule as is,192 but as detailed
above, courts have not adhered to a strict interpretation of the
“substantial disruption” and “material interference” language.193
To account for schools' interests that courts have invoked in
reading Tinker broadly,194 I propose limitations on the
applicability of the new standard. Much as public employees
enjoy First Amendment protection only when they are speaking
as citizens on matters of public concern, passively protesting
students would enjoy First Amendment protection when
speaking on matters of public concern that are school-related.
In sum, the test would have two prongs. First, courts
would determine if the manner of the speech was passive. If it
was not, courts would apply a substantial disruption analysis
under Tinker. If it was passive, courts would then determine if
the speech was about a school-related matter of public concern.
If it was not, courts would still apply Tinker. If it was, the speech
would be protected under the First Amendment.
This two-pronged limitation will function much as
Connick and Garcetti do in limiting the application of Pickering.
191
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Pickering already limits public school teachers much as Tinker
was intended to limit public school students.195 Pickering requires
an interest on the part of the school that is “significantly greater”
than the employee’s free speech right.196 Tinker fits within
Pickering easily because a school’s interest in maintaining
discipline is only significantly greater than the student’s free
speech interest when it is reasonably foreseeable that it will cause
a material interference or substantial disruption.
Students have a particularly important role to play in the
national dialogue around school-related issues. The Supreme
Court said in Citizens United v. FEC197 that “[s]peech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people.”198 Officials must be held
accountable to those whom their policies impact the most
directly and––on school-related issues-––those most impacted
are students. Concerning student protest of gun violence, as one
journalist wrote, “[p]erhaps now is the time for students, who are
the most affected by school shootings, to contribute their own
ideas for change.”199
The free speech interests of the teacher in Pickering were
just as strong as the free speech interests of the students who
participated in the Parkland walkouts. The interests of society
are just as strong as well. According to the marketplace theory,
the First Amendment protects freedom of speech because open
competition between ideas allows the best ones to come to the
fore and inform policy.200 Under this theory, by not allowing
students to contribute to the marketplace, we are inhibiting its
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usefulness by stifling the voices of the actors with the most
relevant expertise to the school environment.201
Determining whether an issue is school-related should not be
difficult for courts. “[W]hen the type of violence threatened does
not implicate ‘the special features of the school environment,’
Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard is the appropriate
vehicle for analyzing such claims.”202 If, as Justice Alito said in
Morse, courts can find that the content of speech uniquely
threatens schools,203 courts should similarly be able to find that
the content of speech uniquely comments on schools.

IV. CONCLUSION
In setting a new legal standard, it is important to consider
how easily it will be applied by non-judicial actors. As Justice
Breyer wrote in Morse, “[t]eachers are neither lawyers nor police
officers; and the law should not demand that they fully
understand the intricacies of our First Amendment
jurisprudence.”204 Determining whether a protest is passive is not
a complicated legal determination like determining a reasonably
foreseeable “substantial disruption” has turned out to be.
Teachers and school administrators are in the best position to
determine whether they can continue teaching in the face of a
protest.
In preparing for the Parkland walkouts, schools knew
what to expect on March 14, 2018: at 10 o’clock in the morning,

201

Students are like experts when it comes to school-related issues because they
spend their days attending school. As Brown puts it, “[s]tudents are an underutilized
source of ‘critical local knowledge,’ and their aired concerns and grievances offer
data about both a school’s climate and practices.” Brown, supra note 23, at 312
(citation omitted). She also points out that teachers, who, like students, are
particularly well-positioned to act as whistleblowers about school-related issues, are
not well-protected by the First Amendment after Garcetti. Id. at 308. Therefore, the
ability of students to speak about school-related issues is even more crucial.
202
Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 392 (quoting Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)).
203
Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
204
Id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2020]

WALKING OUT ON ST UDENT SPEECH

31

students would walk out of class, for seventeen minutes.205
Instead of grappling with whether to enforce school rules
prohibiting cutting class against students engaging in political
protest, or trying to ascertain if classrooms partially emptying for
seventeen minutes amounted to a “substantial disruption,”
schools should have been permitted to know from the outset that
allowing the walkouts to proceed would not be unconstitutional.
Instead of making ambiguous announcements to their
communities,206 issuing confusing guidelines to their staff,207 and
giving detention to large portions of their student body,208 under
the proposed standard schools could have permitted their
students to participate in an important national conversation.
And it is essential that students be permitted to participate in
conversations like the one around gun violence in schools. Tinker
is meant to prevent students from experiencing substantial
disruptions to their education. Meanwhile, the constant threat of
school shootings has become its own substantial disruption to
students’ education.209 The proposed standard would enable
students to contribute their own ideas to discussions about issues
where they are the ones with the most at stake.
No court has applied Tinker in the way proposed here.
Courts have rejected applying Pickering to students as a limitation
within Tinker. But the proposed standard would instead use a
Pickering-style threshold inquiry to selectively offer heightened
protection in accordance with Tinker. Courts have recognized the
value of student speech on matters of public concern. History has
shown us the value of that speech when those matters are schoolrelated. The doctrine must reflect and account for these
paramount interests.
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